

People with college educations, the student said, know more, and hence are better judges of people. But aren't you assuming, I asked, that a college education gives not only what we usually call "knowledge" but also what we usually call "shrewdness" or "wisdom"? Oh, he said, you mean that there isn't any use in going to college!

Francis P. Chisholm


Once we have cast another group in the role of the enemy, we know that they are to be distrusted—that they are evil incarnate. We then twist all their communications to fit our belief.

Jerome D. Frank

# 13

## the two-valued orientation

In the expression, "We must listen to both sides of every question," there is an assumption, frequently unexamined, that every question has two sides—and only two sides. We tend to think in opposites, to feel that what is not good must be bad and that what is not bad must be good. When children are taught English history, for example, the first thing they want to know about every ruler is whether he was a "good king" or a "bad king." Much popular political thought, like the plots of television westerns, views the world as divided into "good guys" and "bad guys"—those who believe in "one-hundred-per-cent Americanism" as opposed to those who harbor "un-American ideas." The same tendency is clearly discernible in those who do not believe in the existence of "neutralist" nations; any nation that is not fully committed to "our side" in the cold war is believed to be on the Russian side. This penchant to divide the world into two opposing forces—"right" versus "wrong," "good" versus



Argument

“evil”—and to ignore or deny the existence of any middle ground, may be termed the *two-valued orientation*.

In a situation of actual physical combat, the two-valued orientation is inevitable—and necessary. Total absorption in the fight reduces reality for the time being into two, and only two, objects of concern—myself and the enemy. This narrowed view of the world is accompanied by accelerated heart-beat and circulation, increased muscular tension, and the release by the adrenal glands of hormones into the blood to contract the arteries and thus slow down the flow of blood in case of injury. This ability to direct and mobilize one's entire mental and physical resources in the face of physical danger—which the physiologist Walter B. Cannon described as the “fight or flight” mechanism—has been necessary to survival through most of the long history of the human race, and probably remains so.

However, for the symbol-using class of life at a high level of cultural development, fighting and fleeing, the primitive outlets for fear, hatred, and anger, are not available. Although we may sometimes get angry enough at our rivals and enemies to want to strike them down, or even to kill them, we have to content ourselves most of the time with verbal assault: calling them names, criticizing them, reporting them to the boss, writing letters of complaint or accusation, outmaneuvering them in social or business competition, or in rare cases instituting lawsuits against them. Words are not blows, name-calling breaks no bones, and even a smashing insult results in no loss of blood. Hence, some individuals—especially those who are quick to lose their tempers and slow to regain them—are in an almost constant state of overstimulation under the influence of a higher-than-necessary concentration of adrenal hormones in their systems. For such people, the two-valued orientation is a way of life.

### The Two-Valued Orientation in Politics

Under a two-party political system such as we have in the United States, there is abundant occasion for uttering two-valued pronouncements.

I have often listened to political speeches carried by sound-trucks in crowded Chicago streets and I have been impressed with the thoroughness with which the Republicans (or Democrats) have been castigated and the Democrats (or Republicans) praised. Not a shadow of praise or even of extenuation is offered to the opposing party. When I once asked a candidate for state representative why this was so, I was told, "Among our folks, it don't pay to be subtle."

Fortunately, most voters regard this two-valuedness of political debate as "part of the game," especially around election time, so that it does not appear to have uniformly harmful consequences; overstatements on either side are at least partially canceled out by overstatements on the other. Nevertheless, there remains a portion of the electorate—and this portion is by no means confined to the uneducated—who take the two-valued orientation seriously. These are the people (and the newspapers) who speak of their opponents as if they were enemies of the nation rather than fellow-Americans with differing views as to what is good for the nation.

On the whole, however, a two-valued orientation in politics is difficult to maintain in a two-party system of government. The parties have to cooperate with each other between elections and therefore have to assume that members of the opposition are something short of fiends in human form. The public, too, in a two-party system, sees that the dire predictions of Republicans regarding the probable results of Democratic rule, and the equally dire predictions of the Democrats regarding Republican rule, are never more than partially fulfilled. Furthermore, criticism of the administration is not only possible, it is energetically encouraged by the opposition. Hence the majority of people can never quite be convinced that one party is "wholly good" and the other "wholly bad."

But when a nation's traditions (or its lack of traditions) permit a political party to feel that it is *so good for the country that no other party has any business existing*—and such a party gets control—there is immediate silencing of opposition. In such a case the party declares its philosophy to be the official philosophy of the nation and its interest to be the interests of the people as a whole. "Whoever is an enemy of the National Socialist party," as the Nazis said, "is an enemy of Germany." Even if you loved Germany greatly, but still didn't agree with the National Socialists as to what was good for Germany, you were liquidated. *Under the one-party system, the two-valued orientation, in its most primitive form, becomes the official national outlook.*

Because the Nazis carried the two-valued orientation to extremes never before reached by a political party—extremes of ridiculousness as well as extremes of barbarity—it is worth while recalling, in the context of semantic study, some of the techniques they used. First of all, the two-valued assumption was explicitly stated over and over again:

Discussion of matters affecting our existence and that of the nation must cease altogether. Anyone who dares to question the rightness of the National Socialist outlook will be branded as a traitor.

HERR SAUCKEL, Nazi Governor of Thuringia, June 20, 1933

Everyone in Germany is a National Socialist—the few outside the party are either lunatics or idiots.

ADOLF HITLER, Klagenfurt, Austria, on April 4, 1938

Quoted by *The New York Times*, April 5, 1938

Everyone not using the greeting "Heil Hitler" or using it only occasionally and unwillingly, shows he is an opponent of the Fuehrer or a pathetic turn-coat . . . The German people's only greeting is "Heil Hitler." Whoever does not use it must recognize that he will be regarded as outside the community of the German nation.

Labor Front chiefs in Saxony, December 5, 1937

National Socialists say: Legality is that which does the German people good; illegality is that which harms the German people.

DR. FRICK, Minister of the Interior

Anyone or anything that stood in the way of Hitler's wishes was "Jewish," "degenerate," "corrupt," "democratic," "internationalist," and, as a crowning insult, "non-Aryan." On the other hand, everything that Hitler chose to call "Aryan" was by definition noble, virtuous, heroic, and altogether glorious. Courage, self-discipline, honor, beauty, health, and joy were "Aryan." Whatever he called upon people to do, he told them to do "to fulfill their Aryan heritage."

An incredible number of areas were examined in terms of this two-valued orientation: art, books, people, calisthenics, mathematics, physics, dogs, cats, architecture, morals, cookery, religion. If Hitler approved, it was "Aryan"; if he disapproved, it was "non-Aryan" or "Jewish-dominated."

We request that every hen lay 130 to 140 eggs a year. The increase can not be achieved by the bastard hens (non-Aryan) which now populate German farm yards. Slaughter these undesirables and replace them. . . .

Nazi Party News Agency, April 3, 1937

The rabbit, it is certain, is no German animal, if only for its painful timidity. It is an immigrant who enjoys a guest's privilege. As for the lion, one sees in him indisputably German fundamental characteristics. Thus one could call him a German abroad.

GENERAL LUDENDORFF, in *Am Quell Deutscher Kraft*

Proper breathing is a means of acquiring heroic national mentality. The art of breathing was formerly characteristic of true Aryanism and known to all Aryan leaders. . . . Let the people again practice the old Aryan wisdom.

Berlin *Weltpolitische Rundschau*, quoted in *The Nation*

Cows or cattle which were brought from Jews directly or indirectly may not be bred with the community bull.

Mayor of the Community of Koenigsdorf, Bavaria.  
*Tegernseerzeitung*, Nazi Party organ, October 1, 1935

There is no place for Heinrich Heine in any collection of works of German poets. . . . When we reject Heine, it is not because we consider every line he wrote bad. The decisive factor is that this man was a Jew. Therefore, there is no place for him in German literature.

Schwarze Korps

Because the Japanese were, before and during World War II, on friendly terms with Hitler's Germany, they were classified as "Aryans." At one point in the war, when Germany was hoping for Mexico as an ally, the German ambassador in Mexico City announced that Mexicans were members of the Nordic race who had emigrated by way of the Bering Straits and come south! But the greatest error in classification that the Nazis made was when they labeled certain theories in physics as "non-Aryan," and deprived of his property, position, and citizenship the originator of those theories, Albert Einstein. Hitler could hardly have guessed then that those same theories would have military consequences beyond his wildest dreams.

The connection between the two-valued orientation and combat is clearly apparent in the history of Nazism. From the moment Hitler achieved power, he told the German people that they were surrounded by enemies. Long before World War II started, the German people were called upon to act as if a war were already in progress. Everyone, including women and children, was pressed into "war" service of one kind or another. In order to keep the combative sense from fizzling out for want of tangible enemies before the start of actual warfare, the people were kept fighting at home against alleged enemies within the gates: principally the Jews, but also anyone else whom the Nazis happened to dislike. Education, too, was made to serve the purposes of war and to create a warlike spirit:

There is no such thing as knowledge for its own sake. Science can only be the soldierly training of our minds for service to the nation. The university must be a battleground for the organization of the intellect. Heil Adolf Hitler and his eternal Reich!

Rector of Jena University

The task of universities is not to teach objective science, but the militant, the warlike, the heroic.

DR. DRECK, headmaster of the Mannheim public schools<sup>1</sup>

The official National Socialist orientation never permitted a relaxation of the two-valued conviction that nothing is too good for the "good," and nothing is too bad for the "bad," and that *there is no middle ground*. "Whoever is not for us is against us!" This is the cry of intolerance armed with certainty.

<sup>1</sup>The National Socialist pronouncements quoted in this chapter are from a collection of such utterances by Adolf Hitler and his associates, compiled by Clara Leiser and published under the title *Lunacy Becomes Us* (1939).

## Man's Inhumanity to Man

The cruelties of the Nazi treatment of Jews and other "enemies"—the wholesale executions, the gas chambers, the "scientific" experiments in torture, starvation, and vivisection performed on political prisoners—have often taxed the credulity of the outside world. Stories of Nazi prison camps and death chambers are still regarded in some quarters as war-time anti-Nazi fabrications.

To the student of two-valued orientations, however, these stories are credible. If good is "absolutely good" and evil is "absolutely evil," the logic of a primitive, two-valued orientation demands that "evil" be exterminated by every means available. Murdering Jews becomes, under this orientation, a moral duty—to be carried out systematically and conscientiously. Judging from the evidence produced at the Nuremberg trials as well as at the Eichmann trial, this appears to be how the task was regarded. Nazi prison guards and executioners carried out their ghastly tasks, not in rage or in fiendish glee, but simply as matters of duty. So completely had the abstraction "Jew" blotted out all other perceptions, that killing Jews became pretty much a matter of course. Aldous Huxley has said that it is the function of propaganda to enable people to do in cold blood things that they could otherwise do only in the heat of passion. Two-valued propaganda, seriously believed, has precisely this effect.

## The Marxist Two-Valued Orientation

The orientation of Russian communist spokesmen is also notoriously two-valued, the world being divided, in their view, into "peace-loving, progressive, scientific, materialist socialists," like themselves, and "war-mongering, bourgeois, reactionary, idealist, imperialistic capitalists," like us—or anyone else who disagrees with their views. Because the communists are extremely concerned with ideology, there is no talk of "blood," "instinct," and "soul" as there was in Nazi Germany, and much talk about "historical necessity," "the class struggle," "objective reality," and "the nature of capitalist exploitation and colonialism." Nazi Germany offers classic examples of the two-valued orientation in rabble-rousing and popular oratory. Russian communism offers the best examples of the two-valued orientation among social theorists, philosophers, and intellectuals.

Lenin molded the theories of Karl Marx into a political weapon, and the combative fervor of the revolutionist has remained an important ingredient of communist oratory and orientation ever since. Lenin had, as Anatol Rapoport has explained, "an intense compulsion to view each difference of opinion as irreconcilable":

If someone whom he considered to be in the enemy camp expressed any view acceptable to him, he took great pains to prove that the opponent was either guilty of inconsistency or was muddle-headed, or else (a favorite explanation) was masking his real nature. If someone in his own camp expressed a view unacceptable to him, he again either accused him of muddle-headedness or argued that eventually this view would drive his erring colleague to the complete acceptance of the enemy position. As Lenin wrote, "Enmesh a single claw and the bird is caught. . . . You cannot eliminate one basic assumption, one substantial part of this philosophy of Marxism (it is as if it were a block of steel) without abandoning objective truth, without falling into the arms of bourgeois-reactionary falsehood."<sup>2</sup>

In short, you either agree *completely* with Lenin (or whoever is running the party at the moment) or you are an outcast.

There is a curious preoccupation with *labeling* in Marxist polemics — a need to characterize the ideological position of an individual or a school of thought with an epithet. In analyzing an author's outlook, a philosophical tendency, or a scientific theory, the Marxist critic first of all has to decide "what it is." Is it "idealism" or "materialism"? Is it "agnosticism," "bourgeois charlatanism," "empirio-criticism," "fideism," "formalism," "immanentism," or "revisionism"? Is it "Trotskyism," "Kautskyism," "Machism," "Kantianism," or "Berkeleyanism"? Is it "Michurinism" or "Weismannism"? Some of these "-isms" are "good," some "bad."

When Marxist polemicists decide that something deserves one of the "bad" labels, they let go with both barrels. Thus, B. Bykhovsky, writing in 1947 on "Semantic Philosophy," found it to be "nothing but . . . a neo-nominalism" which is trying to bring back to life a discredited "subjective idealism." Then comes the blast:

The semantic fad in Anglo-American philosophy is one of the manifestations of the decomposition and decay which characterize the idealist philosophy of the imperialist epoch. . . . The grimaces of the semantic obscurantists, that is, the Walpurgis Night, is celebrated in the darkness which pervades the spiritual life of the modern bourgeoisie. . . . Like all the currents of modern idealist philosophy, semantic idealism is a spiritual weapon of imperialism in its struggle against the progressive ideas of our time. Poisoning the consciousness of the intellectuals with the poison of scepticism, nihilism, and agnosticism, scientific, moral, political, the semanticists are the most vicious enemies of progressive ideas.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup>"Death of Communication with Russia?" ETC., VIII (1950), p. 89.

<sup>3</sup>B. Bykhovsky, "The Morass of Modern Bourgeois Philosophy" (trans. Anatol Rapoport), ETC., VI (1948), pp. 13-15. The article appeared originally in the *Bolshevik: A Theoretical Political Journal* (Moscow), August 30, 1947. With the passage of time and the passing of Stalin, a much more temperate view of semantics has emerged from Marxist circles. See *Introduction to Semantics*, by the Polish philosopher Adam Schaff (1962); also G. Brutyan, *Teoria Poznaniya v Obschchei Semantike* [Theory of Cognition in General Semantics] (Erevan: Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R., 1959). The books by Schaff and

The two-valued character of Soviet orientations is ironically illustrated by the career of Stalin. Long idolized as a great leader, the epitome of strength and wisdom and communist virtue (a "good guy"), he was after his death accused of numberless crimes, among them that of building up a "cult of personality" for the sake of personal power and self-aggrandizement. Towns and streets which had been named after him were renamed, and his body was removed from enshrinement and hauled away to be buried in obscurity (a "bad guy"). Apparently official ideology could find no middle ground for him at some point between "great hero" and "great villain."

The present generation in Soviet Russia is not engaged, as an earlier generation was, in the task of building a new social order. The revolution having been won, there is no longer any need for the revolutionary spirit, so that one of the problems for Soviet leadership is the apathy of the public toward yesterday's fighting slogans and fiery polemics. Soviet leaders respond to this apathy by creating crises to keep people united in a common purpose against "threats to peace"—a technique not unknown in other parts of the world. There are indications that more and more young people, instead of being aroused to patriotic fervor by such propaganda, simply get bored.

The official ideology, however, remains as two-valued as ever. The following account of an interview with a Soviet professor of philosophy is given by Maurice Hindus, who has studied the development of the Soviet Union over many years:

"Suppose," I asked, "a student questions the validity of dialectical materialism?"

"You must remember," the professor replied, "that throughout his five years in the university our student takes courses in dialectical materialism and related subjects. Besides, the study of all our courses is permeated with this philosophy. The student cannot possibly question its validity."

"Suppose he disagrees with the professor's position that there is no truth other than what the dialectical materialism he studies reveals to him? In America, students are free to disagree with their professors."

"Then we reason with the student. On the conclusion of a lecture we have from ten to fifteen minutes of questions and the student is free to bring up whatever arguments come to his mind. The professor takes up the arguments one by one and proves them false. . . ."

"Einstein," I said, "was one of the greatest scientists of all time, and so far as I know he never accepted the philosophy of dialectical materialism."

"We have translated the book Einstein wrote with Enfield [Infeld]. We study the book because the authors are great scientists. But we reject their idealistic doctrines."

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Brutyan are discussed by Rapoport in "Two Marxist Critiques of General Semantics," *ETC.*, XVIII (1961), pp. 289-314. The chapter on "General Semantics" from Schaff's book appears in translation in *ETC.*, XIX (1962), pp. 401-18.

"Suppose the student sees merit in these doctrines?"

"We argue him out of it."

"But suppose he remains unconvinced?"

"Impossible. We have the question period and we hold seminars and in the end we defeat our ideological enemies."

"But if the student persists in contradicting the professor?"

"It doesn't happen. It cannot happen. Our arguments are incontrovertible."

"And if it were to happen?"

This time the professor replied solemnly: "Then the student would place himself outside our Soviet society."<sup>4</sup>

## Two-Valued Logic

The term "two-valued orientation" was originated by Alfred Korzybski, whose main concern was with the orientations that determine health or disorder in people's semantic reactions. Although he described the two-valued orientation as characteristic of a primitive or emotionally disturbed outlook, he was not attacking two-valued logic. Ordinary logic, such as we use in arithmetic, is strictly two-valued. Within the framework of ordinary arithmetic, two plus two are four. This is the "right" answer, and all other answers are "wrong." Many demonstrations in geometry are based on what is called "indirect proof": in order to prove a statement, you take its opposite and assume it to be "true" until you find in the course of further calculation that it leads to a flat contradiction; such a contradiction proves it to be "false," whereupon the original statement is regarded as "true." This too is an application of two-valued logic. Korzybski had no quarrel with arithmetic or geometry, and neither do I.

Logic is a set of rules governing consistency in the use of a language. When we are being "logical," our statements are consistent with each other; they may be accurate "maps" of real "territories" or they may not, but the question whether they are or are not is outside the province of logic. Logic is language about language, not language about things or events. The fact that two quarts of marbles plus two quarts of milk do not add up to four quarts of the mixture does not affect the "truth" of the statement, "Two plus two are four," because all that this statement says is that "four" is the name of "the sum two and two." Of such a statement as "Two plus two are four," a two-valued question may be asked: "Is it true or false?"—meaning, "Is it or is it not consistent with the rest of our system? If we accept it, shall we be able to talk consistently without eventually contradicting ourselves?" As a set of rules for establishing discourse, a two-valued logic is one of the possible instruments for creating order out of linguistic chaos. It is indispensable, of course, to most of mathematics.

<sup>4</sup>Maurice Hindus, *House Without a Roof* (1961).

In some areas of discourse and within some special groups of people, it is possible, so to speak, to "police" the language so that it comes to have some of the clarity and freedom from ambiguity enjoyed by mathematics. In such cases, people may agree to call certain animals "cats," certain forms of government "democracy," and a certain gas "helium." They would also have clear agreements as to what *not* to call "cats," "democracy," or "helium." The two-valued rule of traditional (Aristotelian) logic, "A thing is either a cat or not a cat," and the Aristotelian "law of identity," "A cat is a cat," make a great deal of sense when we understand them as *devices for creating and maintaining order in one's vocabulary*. They may be translated, "We must, in order to understand one another, make up our minds whether we are going to call Tabby a 'cat' or 'not a cat.' And once we have entered into an agreement as to what to call him, let's stick to it."

Such agreements do not, of course, completely solve the problem of what things to call by what names, nor do they guarantee the certainty of statements logically deduced. In other words, definitions, as stated in Chapter 10, say nothing about things, but only describe (and often prescribe) people's linguistic habits. Even with the strictest of agreements, therefore, as to what to call "cats" and what not to call "cats," whatever we may logically deduce about cats may turn out, on extensional examination of Tabby, Cinders, or Fluff, not to be true.

Cats are creatures that meow.  
 Tabby, Cinders, and Fluff are cats.  
 Therefore Tabby, Cinders, and Fluff meow.

But what if Fluff has a sore throat and cannot meow? The *intensional* cat (the cat by definition, whatever our definition may be, "creatures that meow" or any other) is *NOT* the *extensional* cat (Fluff, April 16, 2 P.M.). Each cat is different from every other cat; each cat also, like Bessie the Cow, is a process, undergoing constant change. Therefore, the only way to guarantee the "truth" of logically deduced statements and to arrive at agreements through logic alone is to talk only about cats-by-definition, and not about actual cats at all. The nice thing about cats-by-definition is that, come hell or high water, they always meow (although, to be sure, they only meow-by-definition).

This principle is well understood in mathematics. The mathematical "point" (which "has position but occupies no space") and the mathematical "circle" (which is a "closed figure in which all points are equidistant from the center") exist only as *definitions*; actual points occupy some space, and actual circles are never exactly circular. Hence, in Einstein's words, "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality." Therefore, even in an area such as chemistry, in which the vocabulary is quite strictly "policed," statements logically deduced *still have to be checked* against extensional observation. This is another reason why the

rule for extensional orientation— $\text{cat}_1$  is not  $\text{cat}_2$ —is extremely important. No matter how carefully we have defined the word “cat,” and no matter how logically we have reasoned, extensional cats still have to be examined.

The belief that logic will substantially reduce misunderstanding is widely and uncritically held, although, as a matter of common experience, we all know that people who pride themselves on their logic are usually, of all the people we know, the hardest to get along with. Logic can lead to agreement only when, as in mathematics or the sciences, there are pre-existing, hard-and-fast agreements as to what words stand for. But among our friends, business associates, and casual acquaintances—some of them Catholic and some Protestant, some of them no-nonsense scientists and some mystics, some sports fans and some interested in nothing but money—only the vaguest of linguistic agreements exist. In ordinary conversation, therefore, we have to learn people’s vocabularies in the course of talking with them—which is what all sensible and tactful people do, without even being aware of the process.

On the whole, therefore, except in mathematics and other areas where clear-cut linguistic agreements either exist or can be brought into existence, the assiduous study and practice of traditional, two-valued logic is not recommended.<sup>5</sup> The habitual reliance on two-valued logic in everyday life quickly leads to a two-valued orientation—and we have already seen what that leads to.

Korzybski was rarely concerned with the specific content of people’s beliefs—whether people were religious or unreligious, liberal or conservative. He was concerned, rather, with how people held their beliefs and convictions: whether with a two-valued orientation (“I am right and everybody else is wrong”) or a multi-valued orientation (“I don’t know—let’s see”). Korzybski saw the two-valued orientation as an *internalization* of the laws of Aristotelian logic, which say that:

A is A (law of identity);  
 Everything is either A or not-A (law of the excluded middle);  
 Nothing is both A and not-A (law of non-contradiction).

These “laws of logic” frequently mislead us. Aristotelian logic suggests that if something is “good,” it must be “all good” (identity); that that which is “not good” must be “bad” (exclusion); and that nothing can be “good” and “bad” at the same time (contradiction). In real life, however, good and bad are usually mixed and it is seldom possible to impose such simplistic categories upon experience. The difficulty with Aristotle’s “laws of logic” is that while they seem to be sensible, in fact they are

<sup>5</sup>It is interesting to note that even in mathematics, stress is laid today on the fact that two-valued logic is only one of many possible systems of logic. The logic of probability, on the basis of which insurance companies quote premiums, bookmakers quote odds, and physicists predict the behavior of neutrons, may be regarded as an infinite-valued logic.

inadequate to deal with reality, forcing us to press it into narrow confines.

For example, a football game may be "good" (exciting) and "bad" (your team loses). A book may be "good" (full of useful information) and "bad" (difficult). Aristotle forces one to make oversimplified all-inclusive generalizations, a problem Korzybski was concerned with. He regarded his own system as an internalization of modern, multi-valued and infinite-valued logics. He therefore called general semantics a "non-Aristotelian system." This has led some people to believe that Korzybski was fighting Aristotle. He was not. He was simply fighting unsanity, whether individual or national. As for Aristotle, he must have been one of the sanest men of his time; but anyone whose knowledge and thinking are limited to Aristotle's can hardly behave sanely in our time.

## Defeating One's Own Ends

Action resulting from two-valued orientations notoriously fails to achieve its objectives. The mobs that tried to force dissenting pacifist or religious groups to kiss the flag during World War I did not advance the cause of national defense; they weakened it by creating burning resentments among those minorities. Southern lynch mobs did not solve the Negro problem; they simply made matters worse. What hardens "hardened criminals" is usually the way they are treated by a two-valued society and two-valued policemen. In short, the two-valued orientation increases combativeness but sharply diminishes the ability to evaluate the world accurately. When guided by it for any purpose other than fighting, we practically always achieve results *opposite* from those intended.

Nevertheless, some orators and editorial writers employ the crude, unqualified two-valued orientation with extraordinary frequency, although allegedly in the interests of peace, prosperity, good government, and other laudable aims. Do such writers and speakers use this primitive approach because they know no better? Or are they so contemptuous of their audiences that they feel that "it don't pay to be subtle"? Another possibility is that they are sincere; like some physicians at the mention of "socialized medicine," they cannot help having two-valued reactions when certain hated subjects come into their minds. And still another explanation, less pleasant to think about but in many instances highly probable, is that the two-valued furor is a means of diverting public attention from urgent and practical issues. By making enough of an uproar about "atheism in the state university," "communists on the government payroll," or "who's to blame for the mess in South-East Asia," one can keep people from noticing what is going on in legislative lobbies "crowded," as Winston Churchill once said, "with the touts of protected industries."

## APPLICATIONS

- I. Fervid belief in a cause is one of the strongest and most uncompromising promoters of the two-valued orientation. The Ku Klux Klan, SDS, the WCTU, ardent pacifists, smitten lovers, etc. may find it difficult to avoid the two-valued orientation. Write an essay discussing the pros and cons of the two-valued orientation in a particular situation involving strong convictions of your own.
- II. The two-valued orientation appears in each of the following passages at higher levels of feeling as well as in crude form, qualified as well as unqualified. Analyze each statement carefully, especially in the light of the questions: "How much confidence can I safely repose in the judgment of the author of this passage? A great deal? None at all? Or is there not enough evidence to be able to say?"

1. It's time we hit the sawdust trail. It's time we revived the idea that there is such a thing as sin. . . . It's time we brought self-discipline back into style. . . . So I suggest:

Let's look at our educational institutions at the local level, and if Johnny can't read by the time he's ready to get married let's find out why.

Let's look at the distribution of public largesse, and if, far from alleviating human misery, it is producing the sloth and irresponsibility that intensifies it, let's get it fixed.

Let's quit being bulldozed and bedazzled by self-appointed longhairs. Let's have the guts to say that a book is dirt if that's what we think of it. . . . And if some beatnik welds together a collection of rusty cogwheels and old corset stays and claims it's a greater sculpture than Michelangelo's "David" let's have the courage to say that it looks like junk and may well be. . . .

I am fed up to here with the medicine men who try to pass off pretense for art and prurience for literature. . . .

In this hour of misbehavior, self-indulgence and self-doubt . . . let there be a fresh breeze of new pride, new idealism, new integrity.

JENKIN LLOYD JONES, address to the  
American Society of Newspaper Editors

2. If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem.  
Black Panther slogan
3. *Coffee and Tea*  
Molly, my sister, and I fell out,  
And what do you think it was all about?  
She loved coffee and I loved tea,  
And that was the reason we couldn't agree.

MOTHER GOOSE

4. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Section One, Amendment XV to the Constitution of the United States

5. War is the product of imperialism and the system of exploitation of man by man. Lenin said that "war is always and everywhere begun by the exploiters themselves, by the ruling and oppressing classes." So long as imperialism and the system of exploitation of man by man exist, the imperialists and reactionaries will invariably rely on armed force to maintain their reactionary rule and impose war on the oppressed nations and peoples. This is an objective law independent of man's will. . . .

In the last analysis, whether one dares to wage a tit-for-tat struggle against armed aggression and suppression by the imperialists and their lackeys, whether one dares to fight a people's war against them means whether one dares to embark on revolution. This is the most effective touchstone for distinguishing genuine from fake revolutionaries and Marxist-Leninists.

LIN BIAO, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War"

6. We meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the Legislatures, the Congress, and touches even the ermine on the bench. The people are demoralized; most of the states have been compelled to isolate the voters at the polling place to prevent universal intimidation or bribery. The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled, public opinion silenced, business prostrated, our homes covered with mortgages, labor impoverished, and the land concentrating in the hands of capitalists. . . . The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind, and the possessors of these in turn despise the Republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two greatest classes—tramps and millionaires.

IGNATIUS DONNELLY, Preamble to the platform of the first national convention of the People's Party, Omaha, Nebraska, July 4, 1892

7. The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Free man and slave, patrician and plebian, lord and serf, guild master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

MARX and ENGELS, *The Communist Manifesto*

8. Those who uphold the necessity of dependence upon violence usually much oversimplify the case by setting up a disjunction they regard as self-evident. They say that the sole alternative is putting our trust in parliamentary procedures as they now exist. This isolation of law-making from other social forces and agencies that are constantly operative is wholly unrealistic. Legislatures and congresses do not exist in a vacuum—not even the judges on the bench live in completely secluded sound-proof chambers. The assumption that it is possible for the constitution and activities of law-making bodies to persist unchanged while society itself is undergoing great change is an exercise in verbal formal logic.

JOHN DEWEY, *Liberalism and Social Action*



- III. For those interested in exploring the subject of logic in greater detail, there are a number of excellent books on the subjects of logic and logical thinking.

Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* (1934), which contains a fine discussion of Aristotle's laws of thought in Chapter 9, "Some Problems in Logic."

John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (1957), Chapter 17 being particularly relevant to the matters discussed in this chapter. The discussion of John Stuart Mill and British Empiricism is also useful.

Stuart Chase, *Guides to Straight Thinking* (1956), which has many amusing examples of errors in the thinking process.

Robert H. Thouless, *How to Think Straight* (1950), which is especially good on the subject of *enthymeme*, or syllogism with one of its propositions missing.

 Faith in reason is not only a faith in our own reason but also—and even more—in that of others. Thus a rationalist, even if he believes himself to be intellectually superior to others, will reject all claims to authority since he is aware that, if his intelligence is superior to that of others (which is hard for him to judge), it is so only in so far as he is capable of learning from criticism as well as from his own and other people's mistakes, and that one can learn in this sense only if one takes others and their arguments seriously. Rationalism is therefore bound up with the idea that the other fellow has a right to be heard, and to defend his arguments. 

Karl R. Popper



## the multi-valued orientation

### A Matter of Degree

Except in quarrels and violent controversies when our emotions tend to lead us astray, the language of everyday life shows what may be termed a multi-valued orientation. We have scales of judgment. Instead of "good" and "bad," we have "very bad," "bad," "not bad," "fair," "good," "very good"; we also have mixed judgments: in some respects "good" and in others "bad." Instead of "sane" and "insane," we have "quite sane," "sane enough," "mildly neurotic," "sane on most subjects," "neurotic," "extremely neurotic," and "psychotic." The greater the number of distinctions, the greater becomes the number of courses of action suggested to us. This means that we become increasingly capable of reacting *appropriately* to the many complex situations life presents. The physician does not lump all people together into the two classes of the "healthy" and the "ill." He distinguishes an indefinite number of conditions that may be described as "illness" and has an indefinite number of treatments or combinations of treatments.

The two-valued orientation is an orientation based ultimately, as we have seen, on a single interest. But human beings have many interests: they want to eat, to sleep, to have friends, to publish books, to sell real estate, to build bridges, to listen to music, to maintain peace, to conquer disease. Some of these desires are stronger than others, and life presents a perpetual problem of weighing one set of desires against others and making choices: "I like having the money, but I think I would like having that car even better." "I don't like to stand in line for tickets, but I do want to see that show." "I'd like to fire the strikers, but I think it's more important to obey the labor board." "I'd like to uphold the Constitution, but I don't want to admit Negroes to the University." For weighing the various and complicated desires that civilization gives rise to, an increasingly finely graduated scale of values is necessary, as well as foresight, lest in satisfying one desire we frustrate even more important ones. The ability to see things in terms of more than two values may be referred to as a *multi-valued orientation*.

### The Multi-Valued Orientation and Democracy

The multi-valued orientation shows itself, of course, in almost all intelligent or even moderately intelligent public discussion. The editors of responsible papers, such as *The New York Times*, *Chicago Sun-Times*, *Milwaukee Journal*, *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, *Louisville Courier-Journal*—to name only a few—and the writers for reputable magazines, such as *New Republic*, *Harper's*, *Atlantic Monthly*, *Encounter*, or *Commonweal*, almost invariably avoid the unqualified two-valued orientation. They may condemn communism, but they try to see what makes communists act as they do. They may denounce the actions of a foreign power, but they do not forget the extent to which American actions may have provoked the foreign power into behaving as it did. They may attack a political administration, but they do not forget its positive achievements. It does not matter whether it is from fair-mindedness or timidity that some writers avoid speaking in terms of angels and devils, pure "good" and pure "evil." The important thing is that they do avoid it, and by so doing they keep open the possibility of adjusting differences, reconciling conflicting interests, and arriving at just estimates. There are people who object to this "shilly-shallying" and insist upon an "outright yes or no." They are the Gordian-knot cutters; they may undo the knot, but they ruin the rope.

Indeed, many features of the democratic process presuppose the multi-valued orientation. Even that most ancient of judicial procedures, the trial by jury, restricted to the conclusions "guilty" and "not guilty," is not as two-valued as it looks, since in the very selection of the charge to be brought against the defendant a choice is made among many pos-

sibilities, and also, in the jury's verdict as well as in the judge's sentence, guilt is often modified by recognition of "extenuating circumstances." Modern administrative tribunals and boards of mediation, not tied down by the necessity of arriving at clear verdicts of "guilty" and "not guilty," and empowered to issue "consent decrees" and to close agreements between litigants, are even more multi-valued than the trial by jury and therefore, for some purposes, considerably more efficient.

To take another example, very few bills ever pass a democratic parliamentary body in exactly the form in which they were proposed. Opposing parties argue back and forth, make bargains and compromises with each other, and by this process tend to arrive at decisions that are more nearly adjusted to the needs of everyone in the community than the original proposals. The more fully developed a democracy, the more flexible become its orientations, and the more fully does it reconcile the conflicting desires of the people.

Even more multi-valued is the language of science. Instead of saying "hot" and "cold," we give the temperature in *degrees on a fixed and agreed-upon scale*:—20° F., 37° C., and so on. Instead of saying "strong" and "weak," we give strength in *horsepower or voltage*; instead of "fast" and "slow," we give speed in *miles per hour or feet per second*. Instead of being limited to two answers or even to several, we have an infinite number when we use these numerical methods. The language of science, therefore, can be said to offer an *infinite-valued orientation*. Having at its command the means to adjust action in an infinite number of ways according to the exact situation at hand, science travels rapidly and gets things done.

## The Pitfalls of Debate

In spite of all that has been said to recommend multi-valued and infinite-valued orientation, it must not be overlooked that in the *expression of feelings*, the two-valued orientation is almost unavoidable. There is a profound "emotional" truth in the two-valued orientation that accounts for its adoption in strong expressions of feeling, especially those that call for sympathy, pity, or help in a struggle. "Fight polio!" "Down with slums and up with better housing!" "Throw out the crooks! Vote the Reform ticket!" The more spirited the expression, the more sharply will things be dichotomized into the "good" and the "bad."

Where there are expressions of feeling and therefore affective elements in speaking and writing, the two-valued orientation almost always appears. It is hardly possible to express strong feelings or to arouse the interest of an apathetic listener without conveying to some extent this sense of conflict. Everyone who is trying to promote a cause, therefore, shows the two-valued orientation somewhere in the course of

his writing. It will be found, however, that the two-valued orientation is qualified in all conscientious attempts at presenting what is believed to be truth—qualified sometimes, in the ways explained above, by pointing out what can be said against the "good" and what can be said for the "bad"—qualified at other times by the introduction, elsewhere in the text, of a multi-valued approach to the problems.

The two-valued orientation, in short, can be compared to a paddle, which performs the functions, in primitive methods of navigation, both of starter and steering apparatus. In civilized life the two-valued orientation may be the starter, since it arouses interest with its affective power, but the multi-valued or infinite-valued orientation is the steering apparatus that directs us to our destination.

Although we like to think of ourselves as rational beings, there are few among us who do not exhibit the two-valued orientation when we are stirred up by controversy. In the course of a debate, if one of the debaters has a two-valued orientation which leads him to feel that the Democrats, for example, are "entirely good" and the Republicans "entirely bad," he unconsciously forces his opponent into the position of maintaining that the Democrats are "entirely bad" and the Republicans "entirely good." If we argue with such a person at all, there is hardly any way to escape being put into a position that is as extreme on one side as his is on the other. This fact was well stated by Oliver Wendell Holmes in his *Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table*, where he speaks of the "hydrostatic paradox of controversy":

Don't you know what that means?—Well, I will tell you. You know that, if you had a bent tube, one arm of which was of the size of a pipestem, and the other big enough to hold the ocean, water would stand at the same height in one as in the other. Controversy equalizes fools and wise men in the same way—and the fools know it.

Disputes in which this "equalization" is likely to occur are, of course, a waste of time. The *reductio ad absurdum* of this kind of discussion is often to be found in the high school and college debate as still practiced in some localities. Since both the "affirmative" and "negative" can do little other than exaggerate their own claims and belittle the claims of the opposition, the net intellectual result of such encounters is usually negligible—unless teachers consciously guide the discussions in the direction of multi-valuedness, and draw attention to the processes of abstraction underlying the question under debate. Parliaments and congresses, it will be observed, do not try to conduct much of their serious discussion on the floor. Speeches are made principally for the constituents back home and not for the other legislators. The main work of government is done in the committee room, where the traditional atmosphere of debate is absent. Freed from the necessity of standing resolutely on "affirmative" and "negative" positions, legislators in committee are able to thresh out problems, investigate facts, and arrive at

workable conclusions that represent positions between the possible extremes. It would seem that, in training students to become citizens in a democracy, practice in being members of and testifying before committees of inquiry would be more suitable than debating, after the fashion of medieval schoolmen, for "victory."

In the course of everyday conversation, most of us need to watch for the two-valued orientation in ourselves. In a competitive society, conversation is often a battleground in disguise on which we are constantly (and unconsciously) trying to win victories—showing up the other fellow's errors, exposing his lack of information, confronting him (and all others present) with the superiority of our own erudition and logic. This habit of jousting for status is so deeply ingrained in most of us (especially in professional and university circles) that every meeting of intellectuals and every literary cocktail party is likely to include, as part of the entertainment, some sort of verbal dogfight among those present.<sup>1</sup> Most people in such circles are so accustomed to this jousting that they rarely take offense at the remarks of their opponents. Nevertheless, they waste in argument a good deal of time that might more profitably be spent exchanging information and views. An unconscious assumption, convenient for the purposes of those who are looking for occasions to argue and therefore underlying most of this kind of conversation, is that statements are either "true" or "false."

An important way to get the most out of conversation (and out of other forms of communication) is the following systematic application of the multi-valued orientation. Instead of assuming a statement to be "true" or "false," one should assume that it has a truth-value that stands somewhere between 0 and 100 percent. For example, let us say that we are sympathetic to organized labor, and someone says to us, "Labor unions are rackets." Our immediate temptation is to say, "They are not"—and the battle would be on. But what is the truth-value of the man's statement? It is clearly neither 0 percent ("No unions are rackets") nor 100 percent ("All unions are rackets"). Let us then silently grant a tentative truth-value of 1 percent ("One union out of 100 is a racket") and say to him, "Tell me more." If he has no more basis for his remark than the vague memory of something somebody once wrote in a newspaper column, he will fizzle out shortly, so that we need not be bothered with him any more. But if he does have experience with even one instance of union racketeering, he is talking about something quite real to him, although he may be vastly overgeneralizing his experience. If we listen sympathetically to his experience, the following are some of the things that may happen:

<sup>1</sup>The fame and popularity of Stephen Potter's concept of "one-upmanship" is an amusing commentary on the not-too-well-concealed struggle for status that characterizes our social life. See his *Gamesmanship* (1948) and *Lifemanship* (1951).

1. We may learn something we never knew before. We may, without giving up our pro-union sympathies, at least modify them so that they rest upon a clearer recognition of the shortcomings of unions as well as of their advantages.
2. He may moderate his statement with such an admission as, "Of course, I haven't had experience with many unions." Again, if he tries to describe as extensionally as possible his experience with a labor union, he may find that some term other than "racketeering" more accurately fits the facts. In these and other ways, then, he may modify his remarks and make them increasingly acceptable as he proceeds.
3. By inviting him to communicate to us, we establish lines of communication with him. This enables us later to say things to him which he may then be disposed to listen to.
4. Both may profit from the conversation.

To attempt to converse in this way is to make all our social contacts occasions for what we have earlier called "the pooling of knowledge." We can, if we are able to listen as well as to speak, become better informed and wiser as we grow older instead of being stuck, like some people, with the same little bundle of prejudices at sixty-five that we had at twenty-five.

Statements made in everyday conversation, even if based on slipshod inferences and hasty overgeneralizations, can usually be found to have some modest degree of truth-value. To find the needle of meaning in the haystacks of nonsense that the other fellow is talking is to learn something, even from the apparently prejudiced and uninformed. And if the other fellow is equally patient about looking for the needle of meaning in our haystacks of nonsense, he may learn something from us. Ultimately, all civilized life depends upon the willingness on the part of all of us to learn as well as to teach. To delay one's reactions and to be able to say "Tell me more," and then to *listen before reacting*—these are practical applications of some of the theoretical principles with which this book has been concerned: no statements, not even our own, say all about anything; inferences—for example, that the man who made the nasty remarks about unions is a "labor-hating reactionary"—need to be checked before we react to them; a multi-valued orientation is necessary to democratic discussion and to human cooperation.

### The Open and Closed Mind

Important insights into the two-valued orientation are to be found in *The Open and Closed Mind* (1960), by Milton Rokeach of Michigan State


University. First, Rokeach says, let us divide a communicative event into two elements, the *speaker* and the *statement*. To put matters as simply as possible, the listener may either accept or reject (like or dislike) the speaker; he may likewise accept or reject (agree or disagree with) the statement. Then the following are the possible ways for the listener to react to the communication:

1. he may accept the speaker and accept his statement;
2. he may accept the speaker but reject his statement;
3. he may reject the speaker but accept his statement;
4. he may reject the speaker and reject his statement.

A person with what Rokeach calls a "closed mind" is able to have only reactions (1) and (4): he either accepts the speaker and his statement, or rejects the speaker and his statement. The person with the "open mind," however, is able to have, in addition to reactions (1) and (4), the more complex reactions (2) and (3): of accepting the speaker but rejecting his statement, or rejecting the speaker but accepting his statement.

The person with the closed mind is apparently one who finds life threatening. If either the speaker or the statement is unacceptable to him, he rejects *both*. As the reader will recall, according to Anatol Rapoport's account of Lenin's evaluations, this is exactly the orientation Lenin habitually exhibited: an individual on his side who said anything unacceptable to him was shown to be either muddle-headed or "unconsciously" on the enemy side; anyone on the "enemy" side who said anything acceptable to him was also declared to be either muddle-headed or "masking his true nature." In short, the closed mind is definitely two-valued in its orientation: you have to like *everything* about the speaker or *nothing*.

Psychologically, Rokeach says, all human beings are engaged simultaneously in two tasks: (1) they seek to know more about the world, and



Snap judgment killing a budding thought

(2) they wish to protect themselves from the world—especially from information that might prove upsetting. As the need for defense against disturbing information gets stronger, curiosity about the world gets weaker. ("A person will be open to information insofar as possible, and will reject it, screen it out, or alter it *insofar as necessary*.")

Rokeach refers to the things you believe in as your "belief system," and to the things you don't believe in as your "disbelief system." (For example, if you are a Catholic, Catholicism is your "belief system," and your "disbelief system" would be Protestantism, Judaism, Buddhism, and so on.) If you are a reasonably secure and well-organized individual, you enjoy your own belief system, but you are also open to information about your disbelief system. (You are able, although Catholic, to take in information about Protestantism, Judaism, Buddhism, and so on, and to see the differences among the various bodies of ideas that you do not believe in.) To be open to information about the disbelief system, says Rokeach, is to have an open mind.

However, if you are chronically insecure or anxious or frightened, you cling desperately to your belief system, and you are too busy defending yourself against real or imagined threats to take in information about the disbelief system. That is, if "communism" and "socialism" are both part of your disbelief system, the more frightened you are, the less you are able to distinguish between them.

The term "socialism" is used in a variety of ways in a number of contexts. There is the Russian kind of state capitalism organized under the banner of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There is "democratic socialism" (Sweden, Britain), with "socialistic" measures (health, welfare, unemployment benefits, and such) instituted through democratic, parliamentary procedures. There are also "socialistic" measures imposed by armed dictatorships with the help of informers and secret police (for example, the collectivization of farms in Russia and China). Then there are all the measures called socialistic by their opponents: prepaid medical care, the income tax, social security, aid to dependent children, or whatever. The frightened individual's reaction to all of these different measures is to see them as alike: "One is just as bad as the other—they are all 'socialism,' which means that they are all 'communism.'" Other disturbing areas are also seen as "communism"; the fluoridation of the public water supply, abstract art, or the Negro demand for equal rights. According to Rokeach, *this inability to see the differences among the various things you do not believe in characterizes the closed mind.*

With such a view, the individual with the closed mind looks around at the world through frightened eyes, and he sees what he calls "communism" making progress everywhere. (He does not observe communist setbacks.) From here it takes only a short inferential step to conclude that all these "communists" are secretly united in a vast conspiracy.

Further inferences are made to explain why this "conspiracy" is so "successful." Furthermore, it is believed, our own government has been penetrated by "communists," their "dupes," and "sympathizers." Therefore, it is argued, the most urgent task is to expose and drive from office all the "communists" now occupying high places in our society—especially in government and education. "The greatest dangers to America are internal!"

Robert Welch, who said that "Dwight Eisenhower is a dedicated and conscious agent of the Communist conspiracy" and who in his major opus, *The Blue Book of the John Birch Society*, said that President Roosevelt and General George C. Marshall were guilty of "plain unadulterated treason" (p. 99),<sup>2</sup> gives frequent and eloquent expression to this two-valued orientation and its logical consequences. He says that communists control, or are about to control, all the Moslem nations of the Mediterranean in addition to controlling Eastern Europe. Most of Western Europe is also in communist hands: "Any idea that Norway is not, for all practical purposes, now in Communist hands, or that Iceland and Finland are not completely so, is in my opinion . . . unrealistic" (pp. 18-19). Communists have taken over most of Asia "with the full help of our government, completely misled by Communist influence" (p. 14). Nehru is a communist; so is Nasser. Communists control most of Latin America. They have a "stranglehold on the economic life of Hawaii . . . so great that it constitutes virtual political control" (pp. 20-21). Communists are well entrenched in the State Department; they exercise enormous influence on the press, radio, and television (p. 21). There are "at least thirty huge Communist espionage rings operating in this country today." "Scores of known Communist sympathizers have been restored, by Supreme Court rulings, to their former jobs within our Federal Government" (p. 24).

The [communist] conspiracy is incredibly well organized. It is so well financed that it has billions of dollars annually just to spend on propaganda. It has the benefit of decades of successful experience. . . . And it is guided by men who had to have supreme cunning and ruthlessness to have achieved their present positions within the conspiracy itself.

This octopus is so large that its tentacles now reach into all of the legislative halls, all of the union labor meetings, a majority of the religious gatherings, and most of the schools of the whole world. It has a central nervous system which can make its tentacles in the labor unions of Bolivia, in the farmers' co-operatives of Saskatchewan, in the caucuses of the Social Democrats in West Germany, in the classrooms of the Yale Law School, all retract or reach forward simultaneously. It can make all of these creeping tentacles turn right or left, or a given percent-

<sup>2</sup>The *Blue Book* is based, according to its author, on a series of lectures given before eleven men in an Indianapolis hotel on December 8 and 9, 1958. The John Birch Society was founded at that time by Robert Welch and these eleven. The book is privately printed; page references are to the fourth printing, 1961. Welch's comment on President Eisenhower is from his earlier, privately circulated book, *The Politician*.